SYMPOSIUM ON RACIAL BIAS AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Introduction
Hon. Steven C. González*
At Seattle University School of Law’s Symposium on Racial Bias
and the Criminal Justice System, students, faculty, judges, scholars, lawyers, and community members gathered to address racial disparity in the
criminal justice system and to explore ways to keep the promise of our
democracy that we all are equal before the law. Race, ethnicity, skin color, and national origin profoundly influence our legal structure and our
liberty. The way that race influences perceptions and actions is critically
important in the context of our criminal justice system—a system that
changes lives, disrupts and protects communities, and represents a key
part of our struggle for justice.
Washington’s Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System
(Task Force) came together to investigate disproportionalities in the
criminal justice system and their possible causes, with the aim of making
recommendations for changes to promote fairness and instill public confidence.1 The symposium is part of the Task Force’s call to action, and
the scholars who contributed articles to this issue of the Seattle University Law Review share a commitment to this effort. The articles form a valuable collection as they examine a wide range of actors in the criminal
justice system: criminal defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and law
enforcement. The articles are diverse in subject and style, but read to*
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1. Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 626 (2012).
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gether they highlight the key steps for moving toward our dream of completely eliminating racial bias in criminal, civil, juvenile, and family law
matters. Those steps include (1) acknowledging that racial bias exists, (2)
engaging in research and discussion regarding its causes and impact, and
(3) collaborating in order to achieve solutions.
I. ACKNOWLEDGE
The Task Force began by acknowledging the indisputable fact that
there is racial and ethnic disproportionality in Washington’s criminal
justice system.2 Scholars in this issue similarly start with important
acknowledgements about our social and legal landscape.
In O.P.P.: How “Occupy’s” Race-Based Privilege May Improve
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence For All, Lenese C. Herbert acknowledges that race is not biology but rather a social and legal construct
around which structures have been built and identities formed.3 She describes race as a distorted prism through which we—even those of us
who are the object of racial biases—think about the world and perceive
our experiences.4 Viewing the world through the distorted prism of race
has resulted in a collective unconsciousness about police violence toward
blacks.5 Occupy protesters’ shock about police violence, despite the similar experiences of recent civil rights protestors, makes it apparent that
expectations of privilege and power have developed along racial lines.6
In positioning a historically immune group of people who are white as
victims of police violence, Occupy reveals that “whiteness” is a social
and legal construct—an ideological proposition about who has privilege,
power, and property. The outcry over police violence, regardless of color, positions us to acknowledge collectively what should have been
acknowledged before—that race-based stratifications and differentiation
are a result of political and social, not scientific or actual, constructs.
Herbert’s work brings consciousness to the ways that discrimination and
injustice are still undeniable social facts because race has been built into
our social structures and self-identities in distorted ways.
Mario L. Barnes, Robert S. Chang, Clayton Mosher, and J. Mitchell
Pickerill acknowledge the racially disparate rates of citations and vehicle

2. Id. at 627.
3. Lenese C. Herbert, O.P.P.: How “Occupy’s” Race-Based Privilege May Improve Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence For All, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 727 (2012).
4. Id. at 737 (quoting Wahneema Lubiano, Introduction to THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT vii
(Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1998)).
5. Id. at 744.
6. Id. at 732 n.25.
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searches in Washington State.7 Mosher and Pickerill broaden the traditional academic definition of racial profiling in a way that acknowledges
the potential for bias to influence not only decisions to stop or apprehend, but also decisions about whom to cite and arrest, who to search,
and against whom to use force.8 Barnes and Chang acknowledge that our
antidiscrimination laws fall short and that “much discrimination occurs
for which there is no legal remedy.”9 They advocate for an investigation
of the ways that unconscious or implicit bias operate to produce disparate
outcomes.10
In The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, Robert J. Smith and Justin D. Levinson acknowledge that
“the power to be lenient is . . . the power to discriminate.”11 They examine how implicit bias affects decisions at key points of prosecutorial discretion. Bias operates when prosecutors make charging decisions; it operates when prosecutors make strategic pretrial decisions, such as whether to oppose bail, offer a plea bargain, or disclose potentially exculpatory
evidence to the defense; and it operates in trial strategy when prosecutors
decide to strike potential jurors.12
Andrea D. Lyon acknowledges implicit bias on the other side of the
adversarial system—a topic that has received less treatment in public
discourse. In Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys, Lyon shares that although she began working at
the public defender’s office in Chicago with the expectation that she and
her colleagues were “good” on race issues, she learned that “there is no
person without prejudices.”13 Lyon specifically highlights how she has
observed biases exhibited among defense attorneys when interacting with
clients and when selecting a jury. By framing the discussion around her
own experiences, she brings a uniquely personal tone to this collection of
articles. Lyon posits that our most important focus should be to develop a

7. Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington and Beyond, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 673 (2012); Clayton Mosher & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research with Applications to the Washington State Patrol, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 769 (2012).
8. Mosher & Pickerill, supra note 7, at 769.
9. Barnes & Chang, supra note 7, at 693.
10. Id.
11. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 806 (2012) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at 796−97.
13. Andrea D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense
Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755, 755 (2012).
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willingness to be introspective; it is by acknowledging bias, which is
“not invisible or immutable,” that we overcome it.14
When we acknowledge in an individual and collective way that race
is a social construct, that we observe racially disparate outcomes in the
criminal justice system, and that implicit bias affects decision-making
processes, we provide a platform for engaging in research and discussion.
II. ENGAGE
The work of a group of researchers studying perceptions of judicial
bias in Israel gives us an opportunity to reflect on the tone with which we
must engage in dialogue and debate: without calling each other names or
making assumptions, with openness, and with an awareness of the subjective status of our own views. In Actual Versus Perceived Performance
of Judges by Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, and Issi Rosen-Zvi, researchers explore the relation between perceptions of bias and the underlying reality of judicial behavior.15 They surveyed the Israeli legal community’s perceptions of Israel Supreme Court justices’ biases in criminal
cases and compared the results with justices’ actual votes. Ultimately, the
researchers conclude that justices’ actual voting patterns in mandatoryjurisdiction criminal cases do not explain perceptions of the justices as
being either pro-state or pro-defendant.16 Their research also revealed
that media reports of justices correlate better with perceptions and that
both prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to view justices as hostile to
their clients’ positions.17 The article urges us to move from rhetoric and
accusation to debate through empirical research and measurement.18
In this symposium collection, two groups of researchers engage in
debate about studies of bias in policing in Washington State.19 Researchers commissioned by the Washington State Patrol have been conducting
research on racial profiling since 2001.20 Bivariate analyses of stops, citations, and searches have revealed racially disparate outcomes. Black,
Native-American, Asian, and Hispanic drivers are more likely to be issued citations than white drivers in between twenty-nine and forty of the
forty autonomous patrol areas in the state.21
14. Id. at 761.
15. Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Actual Versus Perceived Performance
of Judges, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695 (2012).
16. Id. at 715.
17. Id. at 722.
18. Id. at 723.
19. Barnes & Chang, supra note 7, at 673; Mosher & Pickerill, supra note 7, at 769.
20. Mosher & Pickerill, supra note 7, at 784.
21. Id. at 786.
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In Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research with Applications to the Washington State Patrol, Mosher and Pickerill discuss important methodological challenges for analyzing data related to stops,
searches, and seizures. To address these methodological issues, Mosher
and Pickerill undertake a more detailed multivariate analysis, trying to
control for additional factors to see if racial disproportionalities can be
accounted for by nonracial factors.22 Mosher and Pickerill posit that
analysis of citations in the context of traffic stops needs to take into account the possibility that “some members of minority groups are less
likely to comply with traffic laws, may be more likely to have a higher
number of traffic violations, and may be more likely to be involved in
more serious traffic offenses, such as driving while impaired.”23 These
“nonracial” factors increase the probability of receiving a citation.
Mosher and Pickerill find attenuated racial bias in the issuing of citations
when the number and seriousness of violations across racial groups are
controlled for.24
In Analyzing Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington and Beyond, Barnes and Chang challenge the methodology of and conclusions
drawn by Mosher and Pickerill.25 While Barnes and Chang agree that
evidence does not support a finding of widespread intentional discrimination on the part of the Washington State Patrol, they argue that race
remains a factor that heightens the probability of citation or search, even
when age, seriousness of the violation, race of the officer, time of day,
and location of the stop are controlled for.26 Barnes and Chang allege
several methodological flaws in Mosher and Pickerill’s approach and
conclude that their own data point toward the operation of implicit bias.27
A group of Seattle University law students also engage in debate
over the rules articulated in State v. Monday28 and the impact of implicit
racial bias on prosecutorial conduct. In “If Justice Is Not Equal For All,
It Is Not Justice”: Racial Bias, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Right
to a Fair Trial in State v. Monday, Michael Callahan argues in favor of
the concurring opinion’s rule, which would not subscribe to the majority’s “illusory harmless error standard” and instead advocated reversal

22. Id. at 789.
23. Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 784.
25. Barnes & Chang, supra note 7, at 676.
26. Id. at 692.
27. Id. at 693.
28. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551 (Wash. 2011).
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any time racial bias is injected into a criminal trial.29 On the other hand,
in “Like Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing”: Combating Racial Bias in Washington State’s Criminal Justice System, Krista L. Nelson and Jacob J.
Stender argue that both the majority and concurring opinions in State v.
Monday at least address the harm of subtle, unconscious racial bias,
which is a step in the right direction.30 They argue that what remains
open to debate is how to identify implicit racial bias and how to combat
its use.31
III. COLLABORATE
We must continue to engage in discussion and explore competing
ideas about approaches. Solutions are to be found in collaboration.
Smith and Levinson call for collaboration among researchers and
policymakers to tackle an implicit bias research agenda in The Impact of
Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion.32 They
discuss the ways in which the “implicit bias revolution” creates opportunities to empirically investigate how actors within the legal system can
perpetuate discrimination in ways that have been—until now—almost
impossible to detect.33 Offering that “the best science is collaborative,
transparent and forward looking,” Smith and Levinson urge researchers
to join them in building up a body of proof to support contentions that
implicit racial bias affects the decisions of prosecutors.34 For example,
they suggest that researchers can test whether participants subliminally
primed with black and white faces make different decisions when deciding how to charge suspects in borderline cases.35
Herbert’s article about Occupy situates us at a pivotal “moment of
clarity”36 and at a time in history when a current social movement provides a profound opportunity to collaborate across historic barriers. Herbert points to the potential for a paradigm-shift that would be foundational for fostering collaboration and changing our legal framework.37
Herbert’s article connects the past and present, highlighting the historical
connection that has been overlooked between civil rights protestors and
29. Michael Callahan, Note, “If Justice Is Not Equal For All, It Is Not Justice”: Racial Bias,
Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Right to a Fair Trial in State v. Monday, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
827 (2012).
30. Krista L. Nelson & Jacob J. Stender, Note, “Like Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing”: Combating
Racial Bias in Washington State’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 865 (2012).
31. Id.
32. Smith & Levinson, supra note 11, at 822.
33. Id. at 795.
34. Id. at 822.
35. Id. at 801.
36. Herbert, supra note 3, at 744.
37. Id. at 749.
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Occupy protestors.38 As shared experience brings consciousness of implicit bias and race as a social construct, we hope we can come together
over common concern about police conduct, criminal prosecutions, criminal defenses, and judicial determinations. Racial bias in the criminal
justice system is not just a “people of color” problem; it is our problem
as a society to address. We must collaborate to move beyond incoherent,
socially constructed concepts of race.
***
There are insufficient studies of implicit racial bias in the criminal
justice system and an insufficient legal framework for addressing the bias
that affects criminal justice outcomes. The articles in this collection and
the dialogue at the symposium begin to fill in missing pieces. We have
much to commend and much more that needs work. Progress happens at
the level of events, not of words, and participating in this symposium is a
valuable response to the Task Force Report’s call to action. The varied
tone and style of the articles highlight how many areas there are for
scholars and citizens of all backgrounds and disciplines to enter the dialogue. Diversity among the voices in the dialogue and in positions within
the legal system is valuable for efforts to eliminate the operation of implicit racial bias and improve the quality of decision-making. In addressing racial bias, we are tasked with hard work as a community and as individuals. With the kind of public discourse and introspection that this
symposium and collection of scholarly work represents, we can
acknowledge, engage, and collaborate to become more culturally competent individuals in a more just society.

38. See id. at 731−32.

